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On the Definition of Public Goods
Assessing Richard A. Musgrave’s contribution
Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay∗
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation of the emergence of the standard text-
book definition of public goods in the middle of the 20th century. It focuses
on Richard Musgrave’s contribution in defining public goods as non-rival and
non-excludable – from 1939 to 1969. Although Samuelson’s mathematical
definition is generally used in models of public goods, the qualitative un-
derstanding of the specificity of pure public goods owes more to Musgrave’s
emphasis on the impossibility of exclusion. This paper also highlights the
importance of the size of the group to which benefits of a public good accrue.
This analysis allow for a reassessment of the Summary table of goods which
first appeared in Musgrave and Musgrave (1973) textbook.
Keywords: Richard A. Musgrave, social goods, public goods, non-rivalry,
non-exclusion
De la définition économique des biens collectifs. Les apports de
Richard A. Musgrave
Cet article retrace l’émergence de la définition standard des biens collectifs au
milieu du 20e siècle. On y traite de la contribution de l’économiste américain
Richard A. Musgrave à la définition des biens collectifs comme répondant
à un double critère de non-exclusion et de non-rivalité. Dans la deuxième
partie, on met en lumière l’importance de la taille du groupe concerné pour
la définition des biens collectifs, ce qui nous permet de proposer (troisième
partie) une amélioration au tableau synthèse qui apparait pour la première
fois dans le manuel de Musgrave et Musgrave (1973).
Mots clés : Richard A. Musgrave, biens sociaux, biens collectifs, non-rivalité,
non-exclusion
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Introduction
This paper is on the history of the concept of Public Goods which came to matu-
rity in the new american Public Finance, roughly from 1939 to 1969. It focuses on
Richard A. Musgrave’s contribution which has been overshadowed by Samelson’s
(1954; 1955) brilliant formal exposition. The former’s impact is decisive especially
on the standard textbook definition. Contrary to what has been claimed by Malkin
and Wildavsky (1991), there is a constant or at least very popular way of defining
(pure) public goods in textbooks as the goods which are neither rival, nor exclud-
able. Musgrave (1969) was the first to use this two-criterion definition as Pickhardt
(2006) has justly noted (in a paper that focused mainly on Samelson’s definition
of public goods).
Specialized articles on the definition of public goods like Sandmo (1987); Cornes
and Sandler (1994); Sturn (1998); Ver Eecke (1999) use this two-criterion. It is
also used in popular public economics texts like Myles (1995); Cornes and San-
dler (1996); Stiglitz (2000); Hindriks and Myles (2006); Rosen and Gayer (2009);
Gruber (2011), as in general introductory textbooks such as Mankiw (2006, 2003);
Ragan and Lipsey (2007); Nicholson and Snyder (2008), and even in more advanced
manuals like Varian (1992) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995).1 It is striking that none of
the aforementioned authoritative texts, except for Ver Eecke’s 1999 paper – which
as a matter of facts is not a highly quoted paper – refer to Musgrave on the topic
of public goods. Microeconomic textbooks are not generally praised for their his-
torical depth, yet they all mention Samelson. The largest specialized book on the
topic, Cornes & Sandler’s (1996) The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and
Club Goods contains short historical references to Adam Smith and David Hume
on public goods, but none of the original contributions of Musgrave appear in the
26 pages of references at the end of the volume. This observation corroborates
Medema’s remark on how textbooks treat the history of economics: “their histori-
cal discussions, to the extent that they exist, are generally limited to bits about the
giants of the past, on whose shoulders the moderns stand, scattered throughout the
text” (Medema, 2011, p. 25). Thus, perhaps Musgrave is not referred to because
he didn’t win the Nobel Prize, or perhaps his modesty on his own contributions
is to blame. Another explanation would be that his contribution, or ‘synthesis’
(Sturn, 2010), in the theory of public goods is mainly conceptual and has not lead
to any formal mathematical model which are the building blocks of contemporary
economic texts.
In the history of economic thought literature, Johnson (2006) explained the
different interpretations of K. Wicksell by James M. Buchanan and Musgrave, and
Sturn (2006, 2010) has analyzed in details the influence of interwar Finanzwis-
senschaft, and other German and Austrian sources on Musgrave’s theory of Public
1The later describe public goods as ‘nondepletable’ (p. 359) and note that they can be classified
according to a second distinction – whether exclusion is possible or not (p.360). The authors also
refer to ‘nonrivalrous’ as synonymous to ‘nondepletable’.
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Finance. Dougherty (2003) acknowledged Musgrave’s role in the conceptualiza-
tion of the free rider hypothesis, and Pickhardt (2006) showed that “it was indeed
Musgrave who primarily assembled the popular contemporary definition of public
goods mentioned above” (p. 448). Moreover, one should recognize the work of aus-
tralian economist John G. Head (1962; 1965; 1968; 1977) who commented and tried
to solve some theoretical issues in the academic discussion on public goods in the
1960s and 1970s by referring extensively to Musgrave. One recent exception is the
entry on Richard A. Musgrave in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics writ-
ten by Mieszkowski (2008) who claims that Musgrave made “original and lasting
contribution” in “public goods theory”, but he does not give proofs of his claim.
Hence, no systematic and retrospective analysis of Musgrave’s contribution in
defining public goods has been made – to my knowledge. In complement to Sturn
(2010), I would like to stress in this paper that free riding was central to Mus-
grave’s market failure approach to public goods which sets him apart from the
voluntary approach which received so much attention in public economics since the
1970s. Furthermore, following the two-criteria definition, many introductory texts
like Mankiw (2006, 2003); Hindriks and Myles (2006); Ragan and Lipsey (2007);
Nicholson and Snyder (2008), and Gruber (2011) make use of a two by two ta-
ble in order to classify 4 different families of goods according to the possibility of
excluding consumer from their benefits or not, and if they are intrinsically rival
or not. This pedagogical device was first conceived by Musgrave and Musgrave
(1973), although no reference to its origin is to be found in any textbooks.
Another way of situating this paper is to separate the conceptual stages of the
modern concept of public good in public finance. First (1), one can circumscribe a
qualitative understanding of the issues at stake in public goods. Lumpiness, joint-
ness, or indivisibility is one dimension that was first recognized by old Continental
public finance scholars.2 The other dimension – the impossibility of exclusion –
which leads to free riding which, in turn, create difficulties for charging and for
revealing preferences was first stated very clearly by Musgrave. The association of
the two necessary criteria which eventually made its way in textbooks has to be
also credited to Musgrave. This will be the main concern of the first section of the
paper.
Second (2), comes the mathematical definition of collective consumption goods
given by Samuelson (1954, p. 387): Let there be n private consumption goods
in an economy X1 . . . , Xn which can be divided among s agents (i = 1, . . . , s)
according to the equation Xj =
∑s
i=1X
i
j . Let also be m collective consumption
goods (Xn+1 . . . , Xn+m) which are such that for every good j from n+1 to n+m,
the following relation holds: Xj = X
i
j ∀i. In other words, those peculiar goods
2Namely Wagner, Sax, Mazzola, Wicksell, Lindahl, Cassel and others whose foundational work
are partly translated in Musgrave and Peacock (1958). On their contribution, see Sturn (2006,
2010); Medema (2005); Wagner and Backhaus (2005); Sinn (2009), and Musgrave’s (1983a; 1985;
1996a; 1997) papers on the history of public finance.
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are simultaneously and collectively consumed (in equal amounts) by all the agents:
“each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any
other individual’s consumption of that good” (ibid). Samuelson then derives the
necessary condition for optimal provision of those collective goods which states that
the sum of the marginal rate of substitution over all the agents must be equal to the
marginal rate of transformation between every pair of goods. This mathematical
development and the further precisions made by Samuelson (1955, 1958) have been
extensively discussed by Musgrave (1983b); Pickhardt (2006) and will not be the
object of this paper.
Third (3), there is the concept of ‘merit wants’ which has been invented by
Musgrave (1957) to describe types of public wants that can be satisfied by goods
(merit goods) “provided for through the public budget, over and above what is
provided for through the market and paid for by private buyers” (Musgrave, 1959,
p. 13). Contrary to social goods (Musgrave’s name for public goods), merit goods
can involve interference with consumer’s sovereignty. Examples of merit goods
are transfers in-kind like housing for the poor, funding for elementary education,
health, public parks and museums, etc. Merit goods can only be understood as
a complement to the concept of pure public (or social) good in public finance.
Therefore, although this paper will not cover the debate on merit goods, it is
hoped that by improving our understanding of public goods, it constitutes a step
in a better appreciation of the problem that merit goods raise.3
Fourth (4), following Wicksell (1896) and the market failure verdict, Musgrave
(1939) suggested that in order to provide the public (social) goods in line with
the preferences of consumers, political solutions for determining which goods and
services should be provided by the State must be studied. An interesting discussion
is to be found in Musgrave (1959, chapter 6), but major developments in this area
grew into two different sub-disciplines namely Social Choice Theory and Public
Choice, and will therefore neither be the topic of this paper.4
Fifth (5), the 1960s and 1970s saw the extension and the generalization of the
concept of public goods to impure or mixed goods. The major contributors to this
work are James M. Buchanan, Charles M. Tiebout, and Mancur Olson. Although
Musgrave didn’t play a key role in the burgeoning of this literature, his 2x2 table
constitute a brilliant synthesis of the diversity of goods. In the second and third
section of this paper, I would like to show how this table can be improved by
incorporating the size of the group to which benefits accrue as a third variable
in the typology of public goods. Surprisingly, while Musgrave’s critique of the
voluntary approach to public goods rests on an argument about the effect of large
3For a recent discussion, see “The Merits of Merit Wants” by Richard Sturn, Paper presented
in May 2013 at the 17th Annual ESHET Conference (Kingston, UK).
4For preliminary historical work on the emergence of Public Choice and Social Choice, see
“The rise and fragmentation of collective choice in the postwar era” by Béatrice Cherrier and
Jean-Baptiste Fleury, Paper presented in May 2013 at the 7th Annual HISRECO Conference
(Cergy, FR).
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number, he was not the first to see how public goods should be qualified by the
size of the group. The other strand of thought followed by the theorists advocating
voluntary exchange, through the prism of external effects rather than focusing on
objective goods and market failure, developed more naturally the idea that the size
of the group was an important characteristic of public goods.
The goal of the paper is twofold. First, it aims at filling the gap described
above in the history of the theory of public goods, by appraising Richard A. Mus-
grave’s contribution. As Medema (2011) recently argued, textbooks are worthwhile
to study in a historical perspective, because they are important mechanisms in the
transmission and in the normalization of knowledge. This paper is not a compre-
hensive study of a textbook, but an inquiry on one important element found in
many textbooks. Thus, it is hoped that this paper will contribute to the under-
standing of the construction of one layer of the domain of modern public finance.
Second, it is claimed that the textbook definition of public goods and the 2x2 table
that results is a useful pedagogical device to introduce students to public economics
by suggesting a clear first best solution to the question of the boundary of State ac-
tion. Hence, the third section suggests a small improvement in the way the theory
of public goods is taught with the use of the summary table.
1 Musgrave’s writings on Social Goods
‘Semantics, as the history of economic thought so well shows, is not a
trivial matter” (Musgrave, 1969, p. 142).
Musgrave himself might be partly responsible for the failure to recognize his con-
tribution in the general understanding of the public goods problem, as he is quite
humble on the matter. In the autobiographical papers (1983a; 1997), as in the
different essays on the history of public finance (1983b; 1985; 1987; 1991b; 1996a),
he does not acknowledge his input on public goods (with the exception of merit
goods). He merely credits himself for having transmitted the scandinavian model
to English-language scholars (Musgrave, 1987). His german background gave him a
“comparative advantage” (Musgrave, 1996b) on the topic of public finance. Hence
his modest self-appraisal: “My initial paper on the Wicksell-Lindahl model (1939),
I like to think helped to bring the problem to the attention of Paul Samuelson,
then a fellow graduate student at Harvard” (ibid.). This claim has been partly
corroborated by Samuelson who remarked in a brief eulogy of Musgrave: “All I
ever knew about the Wicksell–Lindhal Paradigm of Public Goods, I learned only
from Musgrave’s 1937 Ph.D. dissertation.” (Ott et al., 2008, p. 233) Therefore, it
seems reasonable to start by investigating Musgrave’s first paper, based on his doc-
toral dissertation, in which he introduces the voluntary exchange model of public
expenditure.
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The Critique of The Voluntary Exchange Theory
Two years after handing in his PhD thesis at Harvard, Musgrave’s first paper was
published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1939 while he was serving as
instructor in the economics department. The paper is a reconstruction of the Vol-
untary Exchange Theory of Public Economy as can be found in E. Sax, De Viti De
Marco, K. Wicksell, and in a more matured form in E. Lindahl. In their perspec-
tive, “taxes accordingly appear as voluntary payments rendered by the individual
in exchange for services supplied by public economy, and in accordance with his
evaluation of those services.” (Musgrave, 1939, p. 214). The young Musgrave, by
then 29 years old, put forward many arguments against the voluntary approach
– but his main contention is the unrealistic nature of the model which relies on
the hypothesis of voluntary exchange: “[C]onsidering the predominantly compul-
sory nature of the actual revenue-expenditure process, this assumption must be
rejected as highly unrealistic.” (ibid., p. 219) As he puts it in the conclusion of the
paper, to be a useful guide for policy, a theory of Public Economy must be com-
patible with the real institutional framework: “There is little merit in sacrificing
the practical significance of our theoretical framework for the apparent benefit of
unrealistic simplification.” (ibid., p. 237)
The most important argument, for this investigation, against the plausibility
of the voluntary payment for public services is to be found in a long footnote that
must be quoted at length:
We note the theoretical difficulty which arises for the voluntary ex-
change theory in the event that some of the members of the community
should attempt to benefit from public services without in turn being
eager to contribute their share [...] if the total cost of public services is
covered by a large number of contributors, a reduction in the contribu-
tion of any one contributor will fail to affect notably the total supply of
public services – either from the point of view of this contributor or in
the eyes of other contributors who join in the consumption of the same
indivisible services. Hence the reduction will result in a gain for the
contributor in question without leading to reprisals. If all contributors
should accordingly decide to reduce their contributions, the volume of
public services will tend to shrink, and an unstable situation will result.
(p. 219-220, n.5)
One finds here the first clear exposition (at least in English) of what would later
be called the free rider hypothesis.5 It derives from the situation where a large
5On the use of the expression, Tuck (2008, p. 19) acknowledges Buchanan (1965b) originality:
“[He] spelt out the relevance of large groups to the ‘free-rider’ problem in public finance theory,
and drew attention to a similarity between this argument and the prisoners’ dilemma, though he
was also well aware of the important difference between them.” Yet, Tuck (2008, p. 202) later
writes that “[George] Stigler’s discussion of cartels in the 1966 edition [of The Theory of Price]
effectively introduced the term ‘free rider’ into academic discourse, though it was a term which
6
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number of individuals contribute to a collective good or service. Because of this
large number of contributors and the fact that they all benefit collectively from the
service, one individual could reduce his contribution (if he was not forced to pay
for it) without the others noticing it. This individual would then be free riding –
benefiting from the service without actually paying for it – but if many act like
him, the aggregate level of contribution would fall and the service could not be
properly funded. This is the essence of a problem of collective action.6
Marciano (2013) remarks that Buchanan (1964) aptly described the ‘the spectre
of the free rider’ in public goods. Buchanan uses the expression again in 1965a;
1965b; 1966 and in many other papers and books published later. H Musgrave
adds another characteristic to the nature of public services. He writes: “All parties
jointly benefit from the same total of public services” (ibid., p. 224). To which
he adds in a footnote: “The product of public economy is ‘divisible,’ in the sense
that its supply may be increased by small units, but ‘indivisible,’ in the sense that
no separate ‘benefit shares’ may be attributed to individual purchasers.” (p. 224,
n.9) In sum, one can find already two central dimensions of public services: 1)
Voluntary provision cannot be sustained because of the free rider mechanism and
2) they provide ‘joint’ benefits, or benefits which cannot be divided among the
members of the economy.
In place of the Voluntary Exchange Theory, Musgrave proposes a ‘planning’
model that would be applicable to a mixed private-public economy. A government
in such an economy has two problems to solve: “the choice of wants to be satisfied”
and the “execution of such want satisfaction” (ibid., p. 232). The later problem
is easily solved by applying the “principle of least cost” (ibid.). As to the former,
which is more substantial, the task is to choose between the satisfaction of alterna-
tive public and private wants (under the assumption of want homogeneity). The
public authority must resort to a given ‘scale of social wants’ which is “registered
through the medium of public policy.” (ibid., p. 233)
The next year, Neal (1940) published a critique of Musgrave’s ‘Planning Ap-
proach’, contending that the formation of a social preference scale in which an
individual could compare the benefits he gets from the protection of an additional
destroyer to eating another apple was not feasible. Concluding that the provision
of collective demands must then be arbitrary, he warned against such ‘partial plan-
ning’ which would ‘subvert the democracy’ since individuals would not always be
able to exercise and express their rational judgment. What is interesting here is
had long been used among trade unionists.” Despite that claim, Marciano (2013) remarks that
Buchanan (1964) aptly described ‘the spectre of the free rider’ in public goods. Buchanan uses
the expression again in 1965a; 1965b; 1966 and in many other papers and books published later.
Hence it seems it was rather Buchanan who used the expression first in the context of public
goods.
6This line of reasoning will be taken up by Olson (1965). See Section 2 herein.
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not so much this extension of the Mises-Hayek argument to ‘partial planning’, but
the reply that Musgrave (1941) published the year after.
For resorting to a planning model that gives legitimacy to the governement ac-
tion in providing goods and services, Musgrave insists on the difference of nature
between collective and private wants. Although both types of wants are homoge-
nous in the sense that they are assessed by the individual7 in the formation of his
preferences – an act that falls outside the scope of economics – they differ since
“collective wants are satisfied only where the cost of supplying goods or services is
financed out of general revenue and where the benefits accrue to the community at
large or to some of its members independent of their own contributions”(Musgrave,
1941, p. 319, n.3). One could notice that the first feature of collective wants given
here is positive, rather than normative. It is not far from the positive sociologi-
cal or institutional approach that defines public goods as those that are provided
by the State.8 Yet, the other feature – that these wants are satisfied by goods
which benefit every member of a given group (community) independently of each
individual’s contribution hints at a normative criterion. This must be so because
the individuals are coerced into consuming the goods, since if they were asked
for a voluntary contribution, they would free ride and the service would not be
provided. Thus, coerced tax funding is necessary to avoid the free rider pitfall.
Musgrave frames the issue further: “[T]he individual members of the community
will attempt to minimize their contributions, knowing that they can not be excluded
(my emphasis) from the benefits” (Musgrave, 1941, p. 320, n.4).
This last remark is the first occurrence in Musgrave’s writings of the idea that
voluntary provision (i.e. market allocation) of collective goods will fail because
of the impossibility of exclusion. In other words, and assuming a retrospective
point of view, it has been found that individuals express collective wants that
must be satisfied by the Public Economy because the goods provided give rise
to benefits independently of individual contributions since exclusion is not possible
(within a certain group). What’s more, these goods are indivisible in the sense that
individuals benefit ‘jointly’ from them. The intuitions of the standard textbook
definition are accordingly already there, but the specific rationale of each criteria
are not yet clear and explicit.
In addressing the unrealisticness criticism of his model by Neil, Musgrave for-
mulates the core idea of his normative approach9 to public finance: “I am aware
that my model offers no realistic theory of a descriptive sort, but it is realistic in the
sense of pointing towards an attack on the real issues of present day public finances.
The planning model expresses the rationale of efficient government; it supplies us
with a norm against which the accomplishments of our actual revenue-expenditure
7A somewhat similar idea is already stated by De Viti de Marco (1934, p. 38): “Only the
individual can feel pain or pleasure; in this respect, the wants of the group as a whole do not
differ from individual wants, since both have their origin in the individual.”
8See for example Colm (1956) or Malkin and Wildavsky (1991).
9On this, see Desmarais-Tremblay (2012)
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process may be checked” (ibid., p. 324). This will be the guiding line for his work
in the 1950s which led to the publication of the Theory of Public Finance in 1959.
Toward the Theory
In 1941, Musgrave moved to Washington to work as a research economist at the
Federal Reserve. He soon got in charge of the fiscal affairs section, later to be-
come a special assistant to the Fed chairman, Marriner Eccles (Musgrave, 1997).
But he eventually missed academia and accepted a position at the University of
Michigan at Ann Arbor in 1948, then he moved to John Hopkins in 1958, and
then to Princeton at the Woodrow Wilson School in 1962 (Musgrave, 1991a, 1997).
Peacock (1992) recalls having read a first draft of the Theory of Public Finance
when he met Musgrave in 1953 and Samuelson (1955, p. 334) refers to a prelimi-
nary version in a footnote. That year, Musgrave presented a paper at the annual
convention of the Econometric Society in which he set forth the basic structure of
his normative Theory in 3 branches (the service branch, the distribution branch,
and the stabilization branch) which correspond to the three main functions of the
public budget. Each branch performs its function on the assumption that the two
others will meet their objective. For the service branch, which is responsible for
determining the goods and service that must be provided to satisfy public wants,
this means that a “proper” state of distribution has been secured by the distribu-
tion branch and that full employment is guaranteed by the stabilization branch.
This implies that the service branch can balance its budget, or that public ser-
vices can be provided according to the Benefit Principle10 which links revenues
and expenditures together.
Musgrave again assumes homogeneity between private and public wants, they
are both “individual wants” (Musgrave, 1957, p. 334). The main difference be-
tween the two being that “goods and services supplied in the satisfaction of public
wants must be consumed in equal amount by all (original emphasis).” (ibid.) Two
implications are then drawn by the author. First, if a voluntary solution would
be possible, then the aggregate demand curve for an indivisible good must result
from the vertical addition of the individual demands. This result can somehow be
derived from Lindahl’s model and was stated in those terms by Bowen (1943) and
later recuperated by Samuelson (1955).
Second, “since the same amount will be consumed by all, individuals know that
they cannot be excluded from the resulting benefits. This being the case, they
are not forced to reveal their preferences through bidding in the market. The
‘exclusion principle’, which is essential to exchange, cannot be applied; and the
market mechanism does not work.” (ibid.)11 In this quote, Musgrave draws a
10With the exception of merit wants which arise out of a problem of separating the service and
the distribution brach in the case of transfers in kind.
11At this point, Musgrave credits Wicksell (1896) for this reasoning, but one cannot find it
so clearly stated in Wicksell, at least not in the parts that have been translated by James M.
9
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causal explanation of market failure from the distinctive character of public wants.
Clearly here both the indivisibility or jointness, and the impossibly of exclusion are
linked together. The former has received a clearer statement probably influenced
by Samuelson’s (1954) mathematical definition quoted above: The same amount of
good is consumed by all. Then, Musgrave infers that this leads to the impossibility
of exclusion. In some sense, this claim is tautological. If somebody was excluded,
then there would be at least one individual not consuming the good, therefore it
wouldn’t be a public good according to this definition.12 Thus, knowing that they
cannot be excluded, individuals will not be forced to reveal their preferences and
the market fails both as a mechanism of preference revelation (to know which goods
in which quantity must be produced), but also – as it was already clear in 1939 –
as a way to pay for the goods.
In the Theory
In the published version the Theory, the service branch is renamed Allocation
branch. Its function is to provide for the satisfaction of Public Wants, which are
of two kinds: Social Wants and Merit Wants. Notice the slight difference with the
previous definition: “Social wants are those wants satisfied by services that must be
consumed in equal amounts by all. People who do not pay for the services cannot
be excluded from the benefits that results; and since they cannot be excluded from
the benefits, they will not engage in voluntary payments. Hence the market cannot
satisfy such wants. Budgetary provision is needed it they are to be satisfied at
all.” (Musgrave, 1959, p.8). Here the impossibility of exclusion is not inferred from
the jointness in consumption. Musgrave argues that this specificity leads to two
problems. First, preferences will not be revealed, hence the government has to find a
way to ‘induce’ citizens to reveal them. Second, even if preferences would be known,
contrary to market functioning, there is no single given optimal solution. Thus a
Social Welfare function is required to select the desired state of distribution.13
Musgrave adds some further clarification on social wants: “[S]uch wants cannot
be satisfied through the mechanism of the market because (my emphasis) their
enjoyment cannot be made subject to price payment”. (ibid, p. 9) In the case of
private goods, property rights entitle the owner to exclude others from enjoying
the benefits she derives from the good. This is what Musgrave calls ‘the exclusion
Buchanan in Musgrave and Peacock (1958). Musgrave might have had this passage in mind:
“If the individual is to spend his money for private and public uses so that his satisfaction is
maximized, he will obviously pay nothing whatsoever for public purposes (at least if we disregard
fees and similar charges). Whether he pays much or little will affect the scope of public services
so slightly, that for all practical purposes he himself will not notice it at all. Of course, if everyone
were to do the same, the State would soone cease to function. The utility and the marginal utility
of public services (Mazzola’s public goods) for the individual thus depend in the highest degree
on how much the others contribute, but hardly at all on how much he himself contributes.” (p.
81-82)
12This ambiguity will be resolved later when it is shown that one must introduce a group
variable.
13Head remarks that Musgrave is wrong on this, since even in a world of purely private goods,
there is rarely a single optimum.
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principle’ and it does not apply in the case of social wants. Hence, in one sense,
Musgrave (1959) seems to think that it is the impossibility of exclusion that is
the cause of market failure. This is a source of disagreement with Samuelson and
Head who argue that the market failure is caused by the jointness dimension in
public/social goods.14
As in the 1939 and the 1941 papers, the most important words on social goods
of 1959 are to be found in a footnote that must be quoted in full:
It is evident that the case of social wants must involve joint consump-
tion, but joint consumption, as usually defined, does not necessarily
involve social wants. A circus performance involves joint consumption
on the part of those who attend. Yet entrance fees can be charged,
different amounts can be consumed by various people and the service
can be provided through the market. Demand schedules can be added
horizontally. (See p. 76) For a social want to arise, the condition of
equal consumption must apply to all, whether they pay or not. In other
words, we must combine the condition of joint consumption with that
of inapplicability of the exclusion principle. Only then will demand
schedules be added vertically. (ibid, p. 10 n.1)
For the first time, it is clearly stated that two conditions must be met in the case
of social wants – which on consistency grounds should have called for a rewriting
of the definition of social wants given earlier. This fact becomes evident in the case
of an outdoor circus, which was one of the two examples of public goods, along
national defense, given by Samuelson (1955, p.350). Musgrave observes here that
circuses, contrary to national defense, do not result in market failure. Hence there
must be another necessery condition for market failure in the case of social wants,
namely impossibility of exclusion.
Finally, the author reckons that since voluntary payments are not possible, pub-
lic services satisfying social wants must be provided free of direct charge (ibid, p.
15). Since the Distribution and Stabilization branches are assumed to meet their
objectives, funding for those services can follow the Benefit principle. In prac-
tice, this would imply a proportional tax if the elasticity of demand with regard
to income is around one. If it is larger than one, then the tax would need to be
progressive, and if smaller than one, regressive.
14This results from the fact that Samuelson’s (1954) model is too simplistic to account for the
institutional reality. Musgrave praised Wicksell’s intuition, to criticize Samuelson’s attitude: “He
[Wicksell] thus pioneered a normative approach to voting procedures, a model which links the
efficiency problems of social goods provision to the applied issues of how an efficient solution can
be achieved in practice. Samuelson, on the contrary, chose to set aside this aspect of the problem
as leading into an unmanageable game-theoretical morass; but by sticking to the more tractable
issue of efficiency conditions, this rendered social good theory somewhat of a scholastic exercise, of
little help to improving the fiscal performance of the real world setting. I have tried to reestablish
such a linkage, but this is not an easy task.” (Musgrave, 1983a, p. 95)
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In a widely read paper at the time, Head (1962) tried to “examine the meaning
of the public good concept as it appears in Samuelson’s theory, and relate it to the
more familiar Pigovian and Keynesian theories of public policy”. He identifies two
characteristics in Samuelson’s public goods: ‘jointness in supply’ (or ’indivisibility’)
and ‘external economies’ (or ‘jointness in demand’, which he linked to impossibil-
ity of exclusion). Although he surveys all the appropriate works and proceeds to
a sharp and original analysis, the paper is confusing – at least to the retrospective
reader. This is partly to blame on the attempt to relate all the concepts of the
emerging public economics field together in an all-embracing argument for govern-
ment intervention. One must acknowledge his idea of identifying two necessary
dimensions of public goods, but his taxonomy was not favored by history15, even
if that paper was positively referred to by Olson (1965) and Buchanan (1968).
The Biarritz paper
After three years at Princeton, Musgrave moved back to Harvard in 1965 with a
joint appointment in the Department of Economics and the Law School (Musgrave,
1997, p. 25). The year later, he presented a paper at a conference in Biarritz orga-
nized by the International Economic Association.16 In this paper, titled Provision
for social goods, Musgrave reviews “the polar case of a pure social good”17 and
then suggests some generalization to mixed goods. The author explains the shift
in his phenomenological view point: “To emphasise that the distinguishing charac-
teristic derives from the nature of the good, rather than the utility function, I now
prefer the term social good to my earlier terminology of social want” (Musgrave,
1969, p. 126).18 The author then proceeds to (re)define social goods: “The first is
the characteristic of non-rivalness in consumption, i.e. the existence of a beneficial
consumption externality. The second is the characteristic of non-excludability from
consumption. The two are distinct features and need not coincide. Each plays a
different role” (ibid). This is the standard textbook definition that is still used
nowadays.
Musgrave then explains that non-rivalness, the fact that the consumption by
one individual does not reduce the benefits enjoyed by another individual while
consuming the same good, is responsible for the vertical addition of demand curves.
It is also this characteristic which leads to the different necessary condition for
optimality that Samuelson (1954) derived. Incidently, Pickhardt (2006) noted that
Musgrave (1983b, p. 332, n.7) acknowledged that it was Samuelson’s (1955, p. 356)
claim that there exists some “element of variability in the benefits that can go to
15Fifteen years later, Head revisited his 1962 paper, recognizing that “[in a sense] non-
excludability is the more potent cause of market failure” (Head, 1977, p. 235).
16The proceedings of the conference have been edited by Julius Margolis and H. Guitton un-
der the title Public Economics: An analysis of Public Production and Consumption and their
Relations to the Private Sectors, and published by MacMillan in 1969
17Samuelson (1955) uses the term pure public good and admits that it constitutes a polar case.
18Sturn (2006, p. 51) notes that the expression ‘collective needs’ was used more often than
‘collective goods’ in the Austrian school of public finance, from F.B.W. Hermann to E. Sax.
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one citizen at the expense (Musgrave’s emphasis) of some other citizen” which led
him to coin the term non-rivalness in consumption.
Musgrave again states that non-excludability of social goods leads to a difficulty
in revealing preferences. National defense combines both characteristics, but some
goods exhibit only one of the two. An uncrowded bridge is a non-rival good but
exclusion and toll charging is possible. Yet, it is not efficient (Pareto-optimal) to
exclude anyone from the consumption of such a good since she would benefit from
it at no additional cost. On the other side, the orchard which benefits the nearby
bees give rise to a rival consumption (there is a depleting amount of nectar available
to many apiarist neighbours), but the market fails because of the impossibility of
exclusion, or of very high exclusion cost, which boils down to the same thing.
With the given definition of non-rivalness as externality in consumption, Mus-
grave extends the polar case to mixed cases by resorting to variations in the
characterization of the utility function of two consumers. For agent A, the po-
lar case is UA = U(XA, Y ) where XA is a private good and Y is a social good and
UB = U(XB , Y ) for agent B. If Y is a partially social good, then the part paid by
A might not affect as much B as it benefits A. This would be the case for water
treatment by two neighbours living along a waterway. By splitting the respective
part paid by the two agents, one can thus rewrite Y = YA+YB and allow variation
in the intensity of the benefits that accrue to one agent, for example by letting γ
vary for example in UA = U(XA, YA + γYB) and likewise for agent B. The author
analyzes all the (7) cases and summarize them in a 4x4 table in which the polar
case of pure private good lies in one corner and the pure social good in the other
diagonal-opposing corner.
In an addendum, added after the conference to respond to Samuelson’s (1969)
critique of his paper, Musgrave notes that ‘Professor Samuelson, in his preceding
paper, rejects the taxonomy of pages 136-7, and proposes that one should draw
only a single line between the knife-edge concept of the purely private good (my
Case 1) and all the rest.” (Musgrave, 1969, p. 142). After explaining why his anal-
ysis is compatible with Samuelson’s general formulation, Musgrave wisely remarks
“semantics, as the history of economic thought so well shows, is not a trivial matter;
and I remain persuaded that systematic explanation of non-polar situations will be
helpful, as they may point to different policy solution” (ibid).
Public Finance in Theory and Practice
Musgrave coauthored an introductory textbook on Public Finance with his wife,
which was first published by Mcgraw-Hill in 1973.19 The third chapter, on The
Theory of Social Goods, starts by a discussion of the conditions that make the
19 The 778 pages book has been reedited in 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1989. Richard Musgrave
retired from Harvard in 1981, and the couple moved to California where Peggy Musgrave got
an appointment at the University of California, Santa Cruz and where Richard Musgrave also
continued to teach and write for some years. (Musgrave, 1991a). He passed away in 2007.
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market an efficient allocation mechanism, i.e. the application of the exclusion
principle and the rivalness in consumption which makes exclusion efficient. The
authors then proceed to explain a “first instance of market failure”, namely when
exclusion is impossible (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973, p. 53). This leads to
problems of revelation of preferences, at least in the case where the number of
participants is large. Then, they describe a ‘second instance’ of market failure:
“[W]here consumption of certain goods is nonrival. Such goods are here referred to
as ‘social goods’.” (ibid.) After presenting both cases of market failure, the authors
comment on the ‘combined cause’:
While the features of nonrival consumption and nonexcludability need
not go together, in fact they frequently do. In these instances-e.g., air
purification, national defense, streetlights-exclusion both cannot and
should not be applied (original emphasis). Since these are situations
where both causes of market failure overlap, it may be futile to ask
which is the ‘more basic’ cause. However, the nonrival nature of con-
sumption might be considered as such, since it renders exclusion unde-
sirable (inefficient) even if technically feasible. (ibid., p. 54)
This citation is interesting in two regards. First, Musgrave identifies clearly both
non-excludability and non-rivalness as distinct causes of market failure. Second, he
admits that in one sense non-rivalness is the ’more basic’ one, although the question
is ‘futile’. According to Head (1977), Samuelson eventually convinced Musgrave
that this later feature is more important than non-exclusion. Head does not give
evidence for this claim, but in addition to the change in emphasis that was noticed
between 1959 and 1969, one can observe that in the second edition (1976) of the
textbook, the authors invert the order of presentation of the two causes of market
failure, explaining nonrival consumption before nonexcludability.
After the previous quote, the authors summarize the different possibilities in a
2x2 table (see Table 1). In this table, case 1 represents the private-good case where
Exclusion
Consumption
Feasible Not Feasible
Rival 1 2
Nonrival 3 4
Table 1: ‘Summary’ table. Source: Musgrave and Musgrave (1973, p.54)
exclusion is possible and the consumption is rival. The author then explain that
“[i]n all other cases, market failure occurs [. . . ] If we applied the term ‘social good’
to all situations of market failure, cases 2, 3 and 4 would all be included. It is
customary, however to reserve the term for case 3 and 4, i.e., situations of nonrival
consumption”.(ibid.) This is the table that one finds in many public finance and
14
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introductory microeconomics texts without reference to its origin. The tables found
in the textbooks surveyed display examples of goods rather than numbers in the
cells. The first occurrence of this practice (after preliminary research) appears in a
chapter by Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) who do not make any reference to Musgrave
and Musgrave (1973).20 This table is reproduced in the Appendix 1.
To sum up, Musgrave was mainly responsible for the crystallization of the stan-
dard textbook definition of public goods (non-rival, non-excludable). What’s more,
his conceptualization of public goods (or rather social goods as he calls them) is
different from the one developed by some of his contemporaries, chiefly James M.
Buchanan. Musgrave adhere to a market failure theory of public goods. In this
setting, the characteristics of public goods identified by Musgrave help us to under-
stand why markets fail and why government intervention is required. Moreover, it
helps us to delineate the free rider intuition and the collective dimension in some
services provided by the State. In spite of this explanatory role, public goods are
first and foremost recommendations for State action in a normative theory of the
public household.21
2 Considering the size of the group
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in
common: because it is easy to know each other’s mind; and each must
perceive that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is
the abandoning the whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed
impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in any such action;
it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still
more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free
himself of the trouble and expense, and would lay the whole burden
on others. Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences
(Hume, 1740, Book II, part II, p. 239).
Those local or provincial expences of which the benefit is local or provin-
cial (what is laid out, for example, upon the police of a particular town
or district) ought to be defrayed by a local or provincial revenue, and
ought to be no burden upon the general revenue of the society (Smith,
1776, V, I, p. 300).
In his seminal papers, Samuelson (1954, 1955) did not consider any limitation
to the universal jointness (or non-rivalry) of his collective consumption goods. The
20Ostrom (2002) uses a similar table, yet confusingly imply that the table is constructed around
a fusion of ‘Musgrave’s classification’ (Exclusion feasible or not) and ‘Samuelson’s Classificiation’
(whether consumption by one subtract from total available to others). Rather than recognizing
Musgrave’s synthesis, Ostrom argues that Samuelson and Musgrave both “attempted to find a
single criterion”.
21For the dual role of the theory, see my complementary (working) paper Normative and Pos-
itive Theories of Public Finance: Contrasting Musgrave and Buchanan (2012).
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public is indeterminate. Hence, national defence was considered as a collective good
of the same type as a circus performance. Musgrave improved the understanding of
the problem by remarking that circus performances were subject to the exclusion
principle. Though one can further refine the analysis by noting that street lightning
does not benefit the same ‘group’ of people than national defence. This fact was
observed by Smith who recommended – following a strict application of the benefit
principle – that a whole country should not have to fund the lighting of a particular
city. Besides, Hume reasoned that some collective action problems could be solved
by a mutual (voluntary) agreement when the number of individuals concerned was
quite small – otherwise, government action would be required. Likewise, Robinson
and Friday could agree to provide themselves with non-rival and non-excludable
public goods without having the need to establish a coercive government. Thus, to
refine the understanding of public goods, one can consider the size of the relevant
group affected by their provision.
I identify three reasons to consider this dimension of the problem. First, there is
an apparent paradox that must be resolved: Musgrave was not mainly responsible
for the development of the theory of public goods along tho line, but in one sense
it is central in understanding the peculiarity of his conception of public goods.
Second, the analysis explains to a certain extent the development of the theory in
the second half of the 1960s which is partly embodied in the 2x2 table invented by
Musgrave & Musgrave. Third, I will show that all of the refinements are not rep-
resented in the table. Hence, it will be suggested that the table could be improved
by adding a third variable, namely the size of the group to which benefits accrue
(section 3). This investigation contributes to the main goal of the paper which is
to characterize Musgrave’s theory of public goods.
The first step to unfold the apparent paradox is to distinguish three qualitative
levels of the size of the group variable: small numbers, large numbers and very large
numbers. To these three levels correspond two transitions, or conceptual thresholds.
How different are large number situations from small numbers situations? Is the
optimal solution different for goods that affect large numbers of people, yet within a
localized area, than for goods that affect very large numbers of citizens nationwide
or globally? Musgrave contributed to both issues. As quoted in the previous
section, he indicated that the free rider phenomenon rested on the assumption of
large numbers, but did not discuss the matter further. Besides, he initiated a new
sub-branch of public finance, fiscal federalism, where a though reflexion took place
on how community structures impacted the efficient allocation of public goods.
Given this, why was not Musgrave mainly responsible for the development of the
theory along the size variable? The first obvious answer is that the theory normally
evolved, as other scientific endeavours, by collaborative work toward a generaliza-
tion (e.g. Olson (1965)) and by considering more specific cases (eg. Tiebout’s
(1956) local public goods and Buchanan’s (1965a) club goods). Moreover, the in-
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terest of public finance scholars drifted with the evolution of american political
issues. Fiscal centralization reached a peak in the middle of the 1950s and de-
clined thereafter (Oates, 1999). After WWII, public economists were focused on
national government as a solution to the most pressing problems (Fischel, 2000).
As Musgrave already remarked in 1971:
My generation of public-policy oriented economists has been essentially
centralist in approach. In part, this was due to our concern with macro
problems which by their very nature must be handled at the central
level. But it was due also to a political climate in which centralised
action stood for positive policy responsability, while decentralisation
stood for minimising public sector activity and public interference. I
am not persuaded that this nexus has ceased to hold,22 but one must
take note of the voices for decentralisation which now come from all
sides of the political spectrum (Musgrave, 1971, p. 4).
Furthermore, since Musgrave conceptualized public goods as non-excludable, he
did not face the question of how to determine who should be excluded (what is
the relevant group). More generally, public provision was for him a solution to the
market failure caused by free riding, not a challenge like it became for Buchanan
in the 1960s (Marciano, 2013). Finally, one could argue that the externality (spill-
over) conceptualization path taken by others leads more naturally to consider the
size dimension of the problem, than the Samuelson-Musgrave approach in terms of
objective goods.
2.1 Differentiating small groups from large groups
In 1939, Musgrave noted that a voluntary exchange theory was not appropriate
to describe situations involving “a large number of contributors” (Musgrave, 1939,
p.219) to the funding of a public service. This intuition was generalized by Olson
(1965) into a theory of collective action failure for large groups. In his framework,
groups and collective goods are firmly linked. Groups of individuals have common
interests and they succeed in furthering their interest when they provide themselves
with a public good. The State is such a group which provides public goods for
its citizens (Olson, 1965, p. 15). Public goods are defined to be non-excludable
(‘cannot be excluded’) within a group. Non-exclusion is the defining characteristic,
but Olson also remarks that some groups (the ‘inclusive’ ones) also exhibit ‘jointness
in supply’,23 but it is not the case for ‘exclusive’ groups, like members of a cartel.
22He would later reaffirm this view: “Following half a century of fiscal activism and central lead-
ership, the call now is for downsizing the federal budget and a devolution of fiscal responsibilities
to the state and local levels. [...] Behind the call for devolution of federal programs, if less audible,
is also support for shifting from a superior and progressive federal tax system to relying on less
equitable state and local taxation and to widening the scope for fiscal competition. Similarly,
devolution [...] also carries an expectation that lower-level government means less government”
(Musgrave, 1999, p. 172-173).
23On the definition of public goods, Olson refers to Samuelson (1954, 1955), Musgrave (1959)
and Head (1962).
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In the latter, the benefit their members derive from a higher price decreases as
more of them join the group.
An important clarifying step in our conceptual story is taken by Olson, again
in a footnote: “[M]ost collective goods can only be defined with respect to some
specific group. One collective good goes to one group of people, another collective
good to another group; one may benefit the whole world, another only two specific
people” (Olson, 1965, p. 14). His central results is that large (latent) groups will
fail to provide themselves with a public good unless they can coerce their members
in contributing to the cost, or if they can set up separate incentives for them to
contribute voluntarily. In other words, if we focus on voluntary action, only small
groups where one member can provide the good by bearing the full cost on his
own will succeed in furthering their interest. In large groups, three factors add up
to explain the failure of voluntary provision: (i) the larger the group, the smaller
the fraction of benefit accrue to one individual (if benefits are partly rival), (ii) the
larger the group, the less likely that any individual will want to bear the cost on his
own,24 and (iii) the larger the group, the greater the organizational costs (Olson,
1965, p. 45).
Olson’s book was published the same year as Buchanan’s famous paper on club
goods. They both addressed the question of how the size of the group influenced
the voluntary (interested) provision of a public good. As Olson remarked: “Both
of us have been working on this problem independently, and until very recently in
ignorance of each other’s interest in this particular question. Buchanan generously
suggests that I may have asked this question earlier than he did” (Olson, 1965, p.
38, f.58).25 Yet, in order to understand Buchanan’s contribution and his different
vision of the issue at stake, one must study his earlier work on externalities.
In 1962, James M. Buchanan published a paper with Craig Stubblebine in which
they attempt to clarify the notion of Externality. They derive necessary conditions
for Pareto equilibrium equivalent to those presented by Samuelson (1954) and con-
cluded that their “analysis allows the whole treatment of externalities to encompass
the consideration of purely collective goods” (Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962).
In fact, their framework is more general and can be extended to cover impure col-
lective goods. Carrying on this research agenda,26 Kafoglis and Buchanan (1963)
build a two-person geometrical model (that they consider representative of the n-
person model) where the agents negotiate and reach an agreement on the provision
of goods which benefit them both. The objective is to show that if strategic consid-
erations are neglected, private agreement can lead to optimal public good provision
without the need for coercive State intervention. Yet, the authors admit that when
24 One has to bear the total cost on his own. Because of the free rider mechanism, it cannot
be expected that every beneficiary will voluntarily contribute his share.
25Buchanan (1965b, 1968) refers to Olson (1965).
26For a thorough analysis of Buchanan’s original treatment of externalities, as an alternative
to the market failure approach of Samuelson and Musgrave, see Marciano (2013).
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a large number of agents are concerned, voluntary agreement might be very costly
and agents could contemplate a collective-coercive solution; but there is no way to
determine that this last option would be the best:
[W]hen the interactions extend over a large number of persons, the
costs of attaining voluntary agreements may become prohibitive, and
any approach to the ‘optimal’ solution in this fashion may be precluded.
It is in reference to such situations that collectivization arguments are
applied. A complete analysis would, however, take into account the
costs of reaching collective or political decisions, and, when this set of
problems is included, there is no a priori way of determining whether
or not the ‘optimal’ solution may be approached through this means
(ibid, p. 412).
The year later, Buchanan (1964) gave a simple exposition of the problem of the free
rider (probably the first occurrence of this expression in public finance) and the
contractarian solution that he proposed in order to extend the voluntary approach
to cover collective action.27 As it becomes clear, part of Buchanan’s research agenda
in the 1960s is to determine how far can the voluntary, market-like interaction can
be extended in the face of spill-over (external) effects.
In this perspective, Buchanan (1965a) developed another generalization of Samu-
elson’s concept of collective good in The Theory of Clubs, or ‘co-operative member-
ships’. In this famous model, Buchanan assumes that exclusion is feasible and that
the ‘jointness’ (non-rival) dimension of the club good is variable. A representative
individual receives utility from a good, for example a swimming pool, that he can
share with other members of the club. As more individuals are allowed to share
the good, each of them receives a lesser benefit, but pays a smaller cost. For a
given amount of the good, the optimal size of the group (club) is determined at
the point where the marginal benefit of another user is equal to its marginal cost.
Then for a given size of the group, one determines the optimal amount of the good,
by assuming that the individual also values another private good.28
In this framework, Samuelson’s pure collective good is a club good of infinite
optimal number of members, and a purely private good is a club good with optimal
group size of one. This parallels Musgrave’s claim that pure social goods should
be provided free of charge to everyone since they are non-rival. Said differently,
there is a positive marginal social benefit of providing the good to another user at
zero marginal cost. By building this model, Buchanan wants to show that there
is continuity between private and public goods in order to break the ‘public goods
entail public provision’ argument. To do so, he has to take into account the size
of the group to which benefits accrue29, and develops an ex post categorization of
27On Buchanan’s constitutional political economy, see Marciano (2009b).
28In fact, the quantity of the good, the number of members (and the cost distribution among
them) must be simultaneously determined. (Buchanan, 1965a, p. 12)
29Assuming for simplicity that the group of individuals who benefit are the same who pay for
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goods with respect to the size of the optimal group which should provide them.
Despite that, he does not yet stress the threshold between small numbers and large
numbers. With Olson’s argument in mind, it is clear that since Buchanan assumes
voluntary cooperation in clubs, his argument would work only for the foundation of
clubs of relatively small numbers. If we further assume that the clubs are already
organized, then one could expect even large-number clubs to sustain themselves
owing to their ability of excluding non contributors.
Moreover, exclusion must be possible: “In so far as non-exclusion is a charac-
teristic of public goods supply, as Musgrave has suggested, the theory of clubs is of
limited relevance. Nevertheless, some implications of the theory for the whole ex-
cludability question may be indicated. If the structure of property rights is variable,
there would seem to be few goods the services of which are non-excludable, solely
due to some physical attributes. Hence, the theory of clubs is, in one sense, a theory
of optimal exclusion, as well as one of inclusion” (Buchanan, 1965a, p. 13). Yet, if
exclusion is not possible, then the free rider problem arises – writes Buchanan. This
leads him to recommend that, whenever possible, arrangements to secure property
rights should be studied in order to decrease exclusion costs or to adjust exclusion
boundaries to the optimal size.
In Ethical rules, expected values, and large numbers, Buchanan (1965b) provides
an explanation of why voluntary cooperation can be rational in small groups but not
in larger ones. The goal of his paper is to study how the “size of the group within
which [an individual] interact” is a critical determinant of “what influences [his]
choice among ethical rules” (ibid., p.1). Buchanan considers two such ethical rules:
‘the moral law’ which dictates cooperation in all cases, and the ‘private maxim’, or
‘expediency criterion’. In a rational game-theoretic setting, the individual’s choice
of ethical rule will depend upon his expectation of the behaviour of others. In a
small group, he can expect that his choice will have an effect on others. Therefore,
in such a setting, it is not impossible that the group coordinate on the ‘moral law’,
but in a large group where one’s choice cannot influence others, it will always be
rational to select the private maxim. Thus, if all the individuals follow this rational
reasoning, no one will choose the ‘moral law’ and voluntary cooperation will fail
because of the ‘large-number dilemma’. According to the author, the free-rider
problem is a ‘direct analogue’ of the large-number dilemma.
Buchanan clarify further the issue by pointing out a distinction which frequently
goes unnoticed between the free rider problem and the prisoners’ dilemma: “The
difference between the prisoners’ dilemma and the large-group ethical dilemma dis-
cussed here lies in the fact that, as ordinarily presented, the former remains a small-
group phenomenon. The results emerge because of the absence of communication
between the prisoners and because of their mutual distrust. The large-number
dilemma is a more serious one because no additional communication or repetition
the cost of the good.
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of choices can effectively modify the results” (ibid., p.8). Confronted with a public
good problem in a small number setting, selfish rational individuals might want
to transfer the cost on somebody else: ‘Let George do it’. But there is no such
personal interaction in large-number problems. This argument will be reiterated
by Buchanan in 1967 and in the chapter on ‘The Free-Rider Problem’ in his 1968
book. Large number behaviour is not ‘strategic’; there is no bargaining taking
place (Buchanan, 1968, p. 81), the individual “simply treats others as a part of
nature” (ibid.). It is rather in a small-number setting that the individual “will find
it to his advantage to conceal his true preferences and to give false signals about
those preferences to his opponents-partners” (ibid.).
Nevertheless, Buchanan is partly mistaken on the cause of free riding. He writes:
“If the potential benefits are genuinely non-divisible among separate persons, each
one will find it to his own private advantage to refrain from making voluntary
contributions toward the costs of provision” (Buchanan, 1965b, p. 9). Indivisibility
is an ambiguous concept (Head, 1970; Ver Eecke, 1999), but is closer to ‘jointness’,
‘lumpiness’, or ‘non-rivalry’, than non-exclusion. Non-rivalry is not responsible for
the free riding mechanism, it is rather the absence of exclusion as Musgrave and
Olson have shown. In a small club or in a large club,30 the possibility of excluding
members who do not pay prevent the manifestation of the free rider spectre. Hence,
even if the good is provided simultaneously to all agents who are concerned, it is
not sufficient to conclude that free riding will occur.
At the end of the paper, Buchanan makes an interesting remark about the
historical evolution of cooperation norms:
[I]f the sweep of history is considered to make inevitable and irrevoca-
ble the interaction of larger and larger numbers of persons in an ethical
context, the analysis must imply that a smaller and smaller propor-
tion of individuals will come to base their own actions on some version
of the generalization or universalization principle ([‘moral law’]). The
scope for an individualistic, voluntaristic ethics progressively narrowed
through time. As individuals, increasingly, find themselves caught in
the large-number dilemma with respect to ethical choices, a possible
logical explanation is provided for resort to political-governmental pro-
cesses which can, effectively, change the rules and impose standards of
conduct common to all individuals (Buchanan, 1965b, p. 12).
However, the author wants to avoid as much as possible having to resort to coercive
governmental processes. Thus, he advocates solutions to foster small number inter-
actions: “What are the possible means of factoring down complex social interaction
systems into small-group patterns?” (ibid.) One way is to allocate property rights
that will favour – by their nature of allowing exclusion – the emergence of small
30To follow Olson, we should admit that large number clubs might fail to organize, for lack
of incentive but once they are already in place, the possibility of excluding non-contributing
individuals allow them to operate without loss.
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clubs.31 But if political action is inevitable, then following Wicksell, Buchanan
propose that unanimity (or quasi-unanimity) must be required for decisions at
the constitutional level (Buchanan, 1968). This requirement reintroduce strategic
small-number interactions, especially if bargaining and trade of votes between the
citizens is allowed.
Those proposals are consistent with Buchanan’s general view of Constitutional
political economy. Already in the Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock noted
that “[i]f the organization of collective activity can be effectively decentralized, this
decentralization provides one means of introducing marketlike alternatives into the
political process” (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, p. 114). This idea was also at the
core of Tiebout’s (1956) seminal paper on local public goods.
2.2 Local public goods, metropolitan finance and fiscal fed-
eralism
The question that I tackle in this subsection is what differentiates large numbers
from very large numbers on the population scale. In other words, rejecting the
small-number case as irrelevant for most public good issues, I now focus on the
refinement of the typology of public goods along the geographic scale.32
Tiebout first discussed his idea of market-like revelation process for local pub-
lic goods as a PhD student in Musgrave’s graduate seminar at the University of
Michigan in 1952 (Fischel, 2000).33 In the published version of the paper, the
central issue that Tiebout (1956) addresses is taken from Musgrave’s 1939 arti-
cle, Samuelson (1954), and a draft version of the The Theory of Public Finance:
“The core problem with which both Musgrave and Samuelson deal concerns the
mechanism by which consumer-voters register their preferences for public goods”
(Tiebout, 1956, p. 417). Implicitly Tiebout observes that some public services pro-
vide benefits to a community, but not to another one.34 Hence assuming that there
are no spill-over between communities, he builds a model in which every citizen
chooses the community that offers him the fiscal package (tax and services) that
best fits his preference. If there is a large variety of fiscal packages on offer, the
citizen is forced to reveal his preference for public goods by moving (voting with
his feet) to one community or another. For a fixed bundle of services, there is
an optimal size for every community which is determined by the minimum of the
average cost curve for the goods and services. The author acknowledge that in the
case of important spill-overs between communities, ‘some form of integration’ at
31A similar line of policy emerged out of Coase’s (1960) ideas: in small number externality
problems, if transaction costs are insignificant, private arrangements will bring about an optimal
solution and State intervention is not required (except to set up and enforce property rights).
32For a discussion on the relation between the economic approach to federalism and the political
concept of subsidiarity, see Josselin and Marciano (2004).
33Musgrave (1999) confirms the fact but does not give any time reference for the event.
34In the Theory, Musgrave noted that social goods “contribute to the welfare of the whole
community. The benefits resulting from such services will accrue to all who live in the particular
place or society where the services are rendered” (Musgrave, 1959, p.9-10).
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a higher governmental level might be required. This argument will be developed
in details in a paper that Tiebout presented in 1959 at a Conference organized by
James M. Buchanan on behalf of the Universities-NBER.
In this paper, Tiebout (1961) develops a model for fiscal federalism relying only
on economic efficiency. This contrasts with Musgrave’s (1961) paper presented at
the same conference where fiscal federalism is rationalized with respect to different
political objectives of fiscal equalization (between regions and between individuals),
and efficiency. Tiebout’s starting point is the recognition that public goods do not
all provide universal benefits: “[P]ublic goods have a spatial extent on the benefits
side. Moreover, benefits from public services may not accrue equally to all residents
of a region” (Tiebout, 1961, p. 80).
Tiebout assumes the case of pure collective consumption goods (non-rival). He
considers four different characteristics of spatial extension of benefits and discuss
how they impact the optimal fiscal structure, also taking into account economies
of scale. The characteristics are: 1) “benefits from some services accrue in the
same amount to all persons within a region”; 2) “benefits from some services taper
off from the site of production”; 3) “benefits from some services have a spillover
effect”; and 4) “benefits from some services reinforce each other while others do
not”. This conceptualization is important for our story, because it is one of the
first refinements on the supply of public goods within the new american theory,
and also because it will probably influence Buchanan’s (1968) typology of public
goods.
After graduating from Ann Arbour, Tiebout was appointed associate profes-
sor of political science at UCLA, before moving to the geography department at
Washington University in 1962.35 While at UCLA, he participated in an interdis-
ciplinary working group on local governance which also included Vincent Ostrom
and Elinor Ostrom. The latter recalls that they were much influenced by their
reading of Buchanan and Tullock (1962), especially the idea of decentralization:
“Both [the] decentralization and size factors suggest that[,] when [where] possible,
collective action [activity] should be organized in small rather than large political
units. Organizations [organization] in large units may be justified only by the over-
whelming importance of the externalities [externality] that remain[s] after localized
and decentralized collectivization” (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; quoted by Ostrom,
2011, p. 371).36
In a paper that would become very influential in political science, Ostrom,
Tiebout, and Warren (1961) addressed the problem of governance in metropolitan
areas. The authors describe those areas as ‘polycentric political system’, which
means that different levels of government overlap, but not in a concentric struc-
35Charles M. Tiebout died of a heart attack in 1968, aged 43 (Fischel, 2000).
36The words in brackets correspond to the Collected Works of James M. Buchanan edition
(quote herein p. 115).
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ture. Those governments are taken as providing public goods and services for their
citizens. Here it is recognized that the objectives of the governments can be mul-
tifold, which complicates further the problem of designing an optimal multi-level
polycentric system: “In designing the appropriate ‘package’ for the production and
provision of public goods several criteria should be considered. Among these are
control, efficiency, political representation and self-determination” (Ostrom et al.,
1961, p. 835). Since public goods are perceived as solutions to externality prob-
lems, the authors naturally consider the spatial extent of the benefits provided by
those goods and services:
A function of government, then is to internalize the externalities – posi-
tive and negative – for those goods which the producers and consumers
are unable or unwilling to internalize for themselves, and this process
of internalization is identified with the ‘public goods’. Not all public
goods are of the same scale. Scale implies both the geographic domain
and the intensity or weight of the eternality. A playground creates ex-
ternalities which are neighborhoodwide in scope, while national defense
activities benefit a whole nation – and affect many outside it. Thus, for
each public good there corresponds some ‘public’ (ibid., p. 832).
They argue that the exclusion principle is a defining characteristic of public goods,
but is not sufficient to classify all goods in order to recommend the best way of pro-
viding them. Therefore, they introduce the concept of ‘packageability’ to describe
the ability of good or service provision to encompass all its effect within a definite
area (group of citizens). The representation of public goods that emerge is similar
to that of a club good in the sense that it is non-excludable within a certain group,
but exclusive to this group, which means that others outside the fence are excluded.
But there is at least two differences with the club good (1965) concept: first, it
is applicable to government provision, as club goods are thought of as voluntary
organizations. Second, the theory of club goods assumes that exclusion is techni-
cally feasible, but in local public goods it is possible that benefits decrease with
distance which means that technical exclusion is not properly required.37 In their
own words: “Viewing the boundaries of a local unit of government as the ‘package’
in which its public goods are provided, so that those outside the boundaries are
excluded from their use, we may say that where a public good is adequately pack-
aged within appropriate boundaries, it has been successfully internalized” (ibid.,
p. 835). The authors provide an interesting distinction between three definition
of the group relevant for the issue of public good provision, or three ‘elements of
scale’ as they describe it: (i) the ‘scale of the formal organization’ which provides
the good; (ii) the public, ie. those affected by the good; and (iii) the ‘political com-
munity’, which is the group of individuals “who are actually taken into account in
37In practice both effects can combine. In the case of a municipal library, it is possible to
exclude residents of the adjacent town from getting in, but there is a distance at which anyway
the service will not be beneficial for them.
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deciding whether and how to provide it” (ibid., p. 836). In practice the thee groups
rarely correspond, but the ideal solution which respect efficiency, responsibility and
accountability “would require that these three boundaries be coterminous”(ibid.).
The year later, Tiebout and Houston (1962) published a paper in which they
carry on this refinement of the modern theory of public goods to ‘lower levels of
government’. They discuss a framework for public good provision with a hierarchi-
cal order (which reminds of Musgrave’s (1959; 1961) fiscal federalism framework)
where higher levels of government have overriding responsibilities and powers and
can delegate some to lower levels. When applied to public good provision, it yields
a normative typology along the size of the group variable:
From the set of all goods, (1) a sub-set of goods are considered national
social goods and are provided by the federal government; for example,
national defense. (2) Another sub-set of goods are voted partly re-
gional and partly national social goods. Both the federal and lower-level
governments provide these mixed goods; for example, highways.(3) All
other goods are left to the option of non-federal levels of government.
This process is repeated at each level of government. State govern-
ments, the next level below the federal, classify some of the goods as
state social goods, for example, state police. Another class is consid-
ered mixed – education, for example – and so down through the lowest
level of government. The remaining goods, the vast majority, are pri-
vate market goods. After such an ordering is determined, governmental
units, conceptually, can be created to correspond to the scope of the
various goods. (Tiebout and Houston, 1962, p. 413)
What have we learned so far? In this second section, I highlighted the contribu-
tion to the concept of public goods made by a part of the corpus by focusing on the
size of the group dimension. This ‘variable’ is a reconstruction of many discussions
which considered the geographic scale of provision or the number of individuals in-
teracting in a collective action problem as important factors affecting the optimal
provision of public goods. I have focused on two different qualitative regions of the
domain of the variable where a threshold is faced: going from small numbers to
large numbers; and from local to national concerns. This conversation is mostly
taking place in normative public finance. In Musgrave’s framework, the goal is
to advise State administrations on ‘what should be done’, and ‘by whom’. The
objective is to get a first-best recommandation, which can later inform more prac-
tical questions. In this respect, I contend that genuine public good problems are
faced in large-number situations. Small number situations arise in family settings,
groups of friends, in oligopolistic industries, or in committees, but as Musgrave
once put it, large number situations are “typical for most social goods problem”
(Musgrave, 1971, p. 35). Despite the fact that strategic interactions can pose prob-
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lems for voluntary cooperation, small groups can succeed in providing themselves
with non-rival goods that benefit their members.
Thus, public goods in public finance start from a large number assumption.
Then, non-rivalness is added as a defining characteristic. Next comes the question
of exclusion. Buchanan argues that exclusion is possible most of the times (and
at reasonable costs) which explains why he proposed a theory of public goods as
club goods that assumed exclusion. On the other side, Musgrave insisted that
non-exclusion was typical for genuine social goods and thus that public provision
was required. Yet, even if exclusion was possible, Olson proposed a convincing
argument that would challenge the possibility of organizing large (latent) groups
into clubs. In the end, as Marciano (2013, 2011) suggested, Buchanan is more op-
timistic than Musgrave (and Samuelson and Olson) on the possibility of voluntary
cooperation between individuals. This is to be contrasted with Buchanan’s claim
that Musgrave his more ‘optimistic about the workings of democratic politics’ –
namely the capacity of the State to bring about an efficient solution – than he is
(Buchanan, 1999, p. 108). Farrant and Paganelli (2005, p. 85) solve this apparent
paradox by nothing that Buchanan is also a ‘best-case thinker’ (optimistic), but
at the constitutional (and pre-constitutional stage), assuming universal knavery
(pessimism) at the post-constitutional stage only.
Besides, even if collective goods are non-excludable, they still benefit a public,
or group of individuals which normally defines an area. At one extreme, they are
universal, they benefit the whole planet (e.g. the Earth’s atmosphere). At the other
extreme, they benefit only a neighbourhood (e.g. street lightning). On efficiency
grounds (assuming the benefit principle applies), this points in the direction of
structuring the levels of government in order that the decision units correspond to
the public concerned by the goods to be provided.
3 The summary table restated
In this last section of the paper, I would like to go back to the summary table of
Musgrave and Musgrave (1973).38 As it was shown in the introduction, this table
is frequently used in basic textbooks. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider if it can
be improved to take into account an essential dimension of the discussion that was
presented in the previous section, namely the size of the group to which benefits
accrue. For the sake of simplicity, I suggest that the size variable be reduced to a
binary domain: local goods or national ones.39
I discuss below three reasons for such a refinement of the table. First of all, I
think it can improve introductory teaching of public economics by giving a more
precise typology to students without being cumbersome. Second of all, it represents
38See Table 1, p. 14.
39It could be argued that the most interesting ‘higher level’ would be global, rather than
national.
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a partial synthesis of Buchanan’s (1968) typology with Musgrave’s one. Third of
all, it consolidates Musgrave’s definition and respects his vision.
The table is a representation of the typology of goods that results from consid-
ering how goods and services differ according to two criteria (or binary variables):
non-rivalry and non-exclusion. As it was shown, those criteria were formulated in
the context of a discussion on the economic rationale for public intervention. As-
suming large-number situations (except for private goods), the two cases of mixed
goods call for some form of public regulation or funding, and the pure public (so-
cial) good box contains goods that are both non-rival and non-excludable – hence
they must be publicly provided. The objective is to give a first approximation of
what ought to be done by the State, and at the same time introduce students to
some of the issues that will be discussed in public finance/public economics. It
should be noted that this recommendation set follows solely from the objective of
restoring efficiency (from a situation of potential inefficient market failure). This
is implicit in the whole discussion on public goods. Musgrave also acknowledged
(and defended) that governments could act on different values or principles, espe-
cially equity. His fiscal federalism framework is structured on this broader set of
principles, as is the original Allocation function of his Theory which also included
provision of goods to satisfy merit wants. Yet, here, efficiency will still be the only
objective considered.
This being said, take the examples of two pure public goods: street lighting
and national defence. It is clear that they should both be provided by the State,
but, not by the same level of government. This would call for a split of the pure
public good cell (see Table 2 below). Likewise, some toll goods or clubs would
be local, for example public libraries, swimming pools; and others national, for
example highways. Although this category has not been discussed here, the same
could be applied for Common-Pool resources. Fish stock of a lake is a concern
for surrounding residents, but oceans are a matter of national or international
regulation.
Consumption
Exclusion
Rival Nonrival
Feasible private goods
large clubs
small clubs
Not Feasible
large common-pool resources national pure public good
small common-pool resources local pure public goods
Table 2: Refined summary table. Source: Author’s adaptation from Musgrave and
Musgrave (1973).
I have come across two French manuals which present a much more detailed ty-
pology of goods. In his 1988 Fondements de l’économie publique (Foundations
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of public economics), Jean-Jacques Laffont considers 5 criteria for pure public
goods and draws a tree graph representing all the possibilities resulting from 4
of those criteria. For example, pure public goods respect the following criteria:
(i) not destroyed by use/consumption, (ii) non-excludable, (iii) mandatory con-
sumption/use, (iv) collective concern, and (v) no possibility of congestion. The
graph (see Appendix 2) shows the 8 different types of public goods deriving from
three binary criteria (exclusion possibility, mandatory consumption and (spatial)
concern). Likewise, Picard (1992) takes up Laffont’s typology in 5 criteria and
draws a graph showing the 16 different types of goods that result from 4 criteria
(exclusion is feasible, mandatory use, congestion, which community is concerned).
The weaknesses of those typologies are clear. First, if all their criteria are taken
into account, the visual representation of the typology is cumbersome – at least 16
different categories, not counting the private goods. Moreover, they do not cover
the common-pool resources (rival, yet non-excludable goods and services). Second,
I doubt that congestion adds an independent dimension to the analysis. For rival
goods, it is certainly redundant. In the case of club goods, the ability to exclude
provides a way to control the number of users therefore preventing crowding. As for
pure public goods, they are assumed congestion-free up to a certain point. When
crowding occurs, the goods or services stop being non-rival. For example, a bridge
is considered non-rival up to the point of congestion; then rivalry sets in. Hence,
non-rivalry (or ‘non-destruction by use’, as Laffont and Picard write) and conges-
tion are not independent criteria.40
In 1968, James M. Buchanan published a monograph titled The Demand and
Supply of Public Goods in which he synthesizes his work on public goods and
externalities during the past decade. In the 9th chapter, he constructs a typology
of goods to address the question: Which goods should be public?. The first criterion
that he selects is indivisibility. Pure private goods are purely divisible and pure
public goods are purely indivisible in Samuelson (1954) sense that the quantity
available to all is the quantity available to each. This dimension as been shown to
be represented in Musgrave’s concept of non-rivalry (Ver Eecke, 1999). Buchanan
argues in favour of a second criteria: “Goods and services will not hold the same
rank in the scale as the size of the group changes. It is necessary to supplement
the ranking by a second one that describes the range or limit over which the
indivisibility characteristic, if it exists, holds” (Buchanan, 1968, p. 164). The two
criteria are assumed to be continuous which allow for a (cartesian) plane visual
representation of the typology that follows (see appendix 3). The author discusses
5 typical cases: (1) private goods, (2) partly divisible goods which benefit groups
40Mandatory usage is an interesting dimension which is not covered here for two reasons. First,
in the Samuelson definition of joint-consumption (non-rivalry), the goods which are provided to
all, are consumed by all – no discrepancy is allowed. Second, one could argue that the legal
requirement or not to consume a good is more a matter of institutional implementation, than an
objective and general characteristic.
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of small size (or small-number externalities), (3) partly divisible benefits extending
to groups or large size (or large-number externalities), (4) fully indivisible goods
with interactions limited to groups of small size (club goods), and (5) purely public
goods (ibid., pp. 164-168).
From Buchanan’s typology, I venture to say that on can import the size of
the group criterion, while focusing on larger groups and replacing the indivisibility
criterion by non-rivalry. Furthermore, I stress once more that non-exclusion is
an important characteristic of Musgrave’s vision of public goods. These flaws in
Buchanan’s analysis have been criticized by Head (1970):
In the light of his earlier analysis of the large-number voluntary ex-
change model, it is, however, surprising that he ([Buchanan]) does not
bring out more clearly the drastic failure of the market in the large-
number model of a pure public good. Even more than in earlier sections
of the book, the analysis here seems blurred by his failure to draw a
clear distinction between the two major public goods characteristics of
joint supply and impossibility of exclusion. Instead, these two charac-
teristics are apparently lumped together under the portmanteau term
‘indivisibility’, which conceals more than it reveals in a public goods
context. [. . . ] However, unless the further characteristic of impossi-
bility of exclusion applies, a market mechanism (a legal monopoly, or
even perfect competition) may function tolerably well, thouglt of course
not perfectly. [. . . ] If, by contrast, price-exclusion is also impossible,
market techniques fail disastrously in what Buchanan calls their allo-
cation and financing functions. [. . . ] These conclusions suggest that
the heavy emphasis on the joint supply characteristic of public goods
in Buchanan (and also in Samuelson) is in some respects dangerously
misleading (Head, 1970, p. 119-120).
Musgrave also criticized Buchanan’s reliance on two-agents models to explain
how voluntary cooperation might result in efficient public good provision: “While
I feel that small-number case remains important in its own right, I agree that the
large number problem is the central issue. I am sceptical, however, about the an-
alytical usefulness of small-number theory for the large number case (Musgrave,
1970, p.123). Marciano (2009a) noted that Buchanan (1964) criticized Robbins’
definition of economics as a science of choice – favouring instead a catallactic (ex-
change) approach to the science. Buchanan argued that Robinson Crusoe’s prob-
lem was a technical issue for engineers, not a matter of interest for economists who
should instead study (voluntary and subjective) exchanges between individuals. In
the case of genuine public goods problems though, as Buchanan himself recognized,
a two-persons model is not the appropriate framework. Buchanan criticized Robin-
son economics, but at times (1967; 1968) he merely added Friday to the story (or
Tizio and Caio as he named them) which I think is still a ‘Robinsonade’ when the
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aim is to apprehend collective good issues.
The third argument in favour of ‘tuning up’ Musgrave & Musgrave Summary
table table is that the proposed refinement respect their vision. It is motivated
by a desire to consolidate a useful pedagogical device. Musgrave’s larger Theory
of public finance structured in three branches – in which this whole discussion on
public provision of collective goods took shape – has always been praised as a useful
pedagogical device (R. A. Musgrave, 1989; Solow, 2008; P. Musgrave, 2008). In
addition, Musgrave and Musgrave (2003) recently corroborated the idea that the
size of the group to which benefits accrue was an important dimension of public
goods. In the prologue of a book on Global public goods, they stated:
Non rival availability of benefits to all members of the benefiting group
is the essential characteristic of public goods, but the group has to
be defined. Groups can be defined along various dimensions. Public
concerts provide benefits to people who like music but are of no value
to the deaf. Many groups can be considered. But among them the
area over which benefits extend is of particular concern to this volume,
with its linkage of public and global in the role of global public goods
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 2003, p. xiii).
Conclusion
Samuelson’s (1954) simple exposition of the necessary conditions for optimal pro-
vision of collective goods was presented as an addendum to the chapter on Welfare
Economics of his Foundations (1948). It generated a fresh wave of interest in
America for public expenditure theory in public finance, out of which grew pub-
lic economics as a new branch of economics. Musgrave was conductive to raising
Samuelson’s interest in the public good issue. Still, after Samuelson’s brief involve-
ment in this discussion, Musgrave made other important contributions toward the
standard textbook definition of public goods which have not been recognized in the
literature. Thanks to him, non-exclusion is generally recognized as a defining char-
acteristic of public goods. In the discussion that took place in the 1950s and 1960s,
different conceptualizations of the problem of public goods emerged. I have high-
lighted Musgrave’s particular interpretation. Non-exclusion from the consumption
of a public good causes free riding to occur which leads to preference-revelation
problems. This first instance of market failure can combine with a second one.
When goods are non-rival, their free availability to everyone – made possible only
through public provision – is socially desirable (Pareto improving). In retrospect, it
is obvious that this policy recommendation rests on the assumption of a benevolent
government (that does not fail).
Olson and Buchanan helped to clarify the significance of large numbers for the
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free rider phenomenon. The latter explained why this dilemma was not to be con-
fused with the two persons prisonner’s dilemma. However, Buchanan saw public
provision as a challenge and tried to make voluntary provision work in the face of
the spectre of the free rider. Thus, he argued that most of the times, goods provide
only partially indivisible benefits to a relatively small group of persons. This al-
lowed for a decentralized local solution to the problem. Besides, Buchanan argued
that exclusion was rarely impossible, which permit voluntary clubs to provide the
goods. Both arguments delegitimize the intervention of the central governement in
providing goods.
Nevertheless, the large number assumption is central in Musgrave’s assessment
of public goods. Indeed, when the number of potential consumers is small, the
ability to exclude does not matter much. That explains why the fiction of Robin-
son Crusoe and Friday is not relevant for public goods analysis in public finance.
Contrary to Buchanan, Musgrave did not favour forging small number interaction
situations, partly because it creates a new set of imperfections due to strategic
behaviour (Musgrave, 1969).
In sum, genuine public goods issues in public finance arise when a large number
of citizens, of a definite community, demand non-rival and non-excludable goods
and services. This community can be either local, national, or global. The concept
of public good (or social good) is thus an ideal concept (Ver Eecke, 1999) which can
be represented in a table, along with some departures from it. Since it is an ideal
concept, it is not to be looked for directly in the world. When trying to apprehend
real-world public services with Musgrave’s typology, some concessions must be
made. For instance, implicit institutional constraints and political traditions are
weaved into every bottom-up fit. In spite of that, I think the summary table
of this typology is a useful pedagogical device. As Sturn (2010, p. 307) aptly
remarked: “Musgrave’s influence on modern Public Economics is an example of how
the dissemination of innovations is enhanced by a suitable expository framework.”
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Appendix 1168 PATTERNS OF ORDER 
FIGURE 1 of Goods 
I J ointness of Use or Consumption 
Private Goods: Toll Goods: 
Bread, shoes, au- theaters, night-
tomobiles, hair- clubs, telephone 
cuts, books service, toll roads, Feasible 
cable TV, electric (Low Cost) 
power, libraries 
Common-Pool Public Goods: 
Resources: peace and secu-
water pumped rity of a commu-
from a groundwa- nity, national 
ter basin, fish defense, mos- Infeasible 
taken from an quito abatement, (Costly) 
ocean, crude oil air pollution con-
extracted from an trol, fire protec-
oil pool tion, streets, 
weather forecasts, 
public TV 
I Alternative Use I I Joint Use I 
SOURCE: Author. 
The range of services rendered by governmental agencies may 
cover goods and services of every type. The food supplied to school 
children under surplus commodity programs is an example of 
government's supplying purely private goods. Most governmental 
services, however, are of the public good, toll good, or common-
pool resource type. These variations may have significant implica-
tions for-to take one example-the development of user charges 
as substitutes for taxes. In this discussion we shall focus more upon 
the type characterized as public goods because it poses the more 
difficult problems in the operation of a public economy. 
Source: Ostrom and Ostrom (1977, p. 168)
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Appendix 2
Source: Laffont (1988, p. 41)
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Appendix 3
Which Goods Should Be Public? 165
0 I
(5)
(4)
R T,
Degree
of
indivisibility
(2) (3)
R t
(1)
0 P
Sizeof interacting group
Figure9.1
purposes of later analysis. Goods and services classified as falling at or near
0' may be put in category (5).
Three additional categories are noted in Figure 9.1, although no attempt
is made to delineate precisely the areas of the figure to which these might
refer. Category (2) includes those goods and services that are partially divis-
ible, but which involve indivisibility or "publicness" elements only over a lim-
ited number of persons. Category (3) likewise includes goods and services
that are only partially divisible. But here the publicness elements extend over
a large number of persons. Category (4) covers those goods and services that
are fully indivisible, or nearly so, but for which the range of indivisibility ex-
tends only over groups of limited size. Whole areas may be empty; few goods
and services are likely to be found near the southeast corner of the diagram.
It will be helpful to discuss the relevant categories falling between (1) and (5)
in more detail.
Source: Buchanan (1968, p. 165)
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